On the final document of the
BIO-WEAPONS TREATY SIXTH REVIEW CONFERENCE

FINAL dispatch from Carol Urner at the United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland: 11/24/06

NOTE: Contact me with questions or comments at carol.disarm@gmail.com and I will try to respond.

The Sixth Review Conference of the Bioweapons Treaty ended on December 10th. The best summary of the final statement of the conference is from the Bioweapons Prevention Project.

You can also download the Informal Advance Copy of the Final Document (without annexes) on the United Nations site for the Bioweapons Review Conference. Geneva WILPF has not yet issued a final report since it was difficult for the DISARM Interns, Beatrice and Katherine, to obtain information about the closed sessions which they and other NGO representatives could not attend.

But here follow my own very unofficial observations of the significance for WILPF.

First, you will note that this conference achieved far more that most of us dared hope, and gives us a foundation on which to build for the future. The nations of the world did unite in an attempt to save the treaty after the debacle in 2001 when John Bolton torpedoed the Inspection Protocol and the Fifth Review Conference ended in despair and disarray. Although disagreements between Iran and the United States could not be resolved, even in last minute negotiations until 3:00 am on Friday, preventing consensus on the action proposals into which delegates had put so much energy, the rest of the final document gives cause for hope that significant forward progress can be made in the next five years. We on DISARM will try to find out the nature of the objections of both Iran and the United States and post the information on our DISARM UPDATE.

Of particular importance is the decision to continue the annual intersessional meetings that have proven so productive during the past five years. Next year delegates will consider improving legislation in each of the nations party to the treaty in order to bring them into conformity with the treaty in areas like transparency, reporting and oversight. This gives us legislative opportunities in the United States to press forward on these issues before November, 2007 and the next major intersessional meeting. Neat if we could find a new Committee or Subcommittee chair willing to launch an investigation of the entire $44 billion (since 2002) program.

I reported earlier on my excitement over the proposals of VERTIC in Verification Matters: A new strategy: strengthening the biological weapons regime through modular mechanisms. The publication is already on the web, but VERTIC is also sending us hard copies to use with members of Congress (and their staffs) who might pursue the search for transparency in our biodefense and possible bioweapons programs. Neat if we can also find a Congressperson to launch an investigation of the whole program.

Bad news, however, is the passage of the BARDA legislation in the closing days of the 109th Congress. We will post information on the vote as soon as it is available on Thomas. This legislation further enshrouds the entire civilian Bioterror research program in secrecy.

Deepest appreciation from the entire DISARM TEAM for the excellent work of the BOSTON WILPF Disarm Committee on these issues in their own community, statewide, and in relationship to the Bioweapons Treaty. Read the previous dispatch from the Geneva UN for a brief report on the seminar in which Boston WILPF's contribution was the major element, and read the paper they presented to delegates in Geneva.

Now we need other concerned WILPFers to join the effort in communities around the country, and some member to take on coordination of our community and legislative efforts. Let's bring in new members to help with this if we can -- and of course we need to engage other U.S. NGOs on this issue. There is very little concerted work on bioweapons prevention in our own country, which at present has the largest potential bioweapons project in the world. There is an extreme danger that, if they don't have proof the U.S. program is benign, nations like Russia and China will follow suit with large bio-weapons programs of their own.

Most of us perceive the new U.S. nuclear program -- Complex 2030 -- as the greatest WMD threat to our planet and humankind, but tinkering with the human genome to create new, lethal strains of already dread diseases, is also extremely dangerous, regardless of whether such tinkering is part of a "biodefense" or a "bioweapons" program.

From the
BIO-WEAPONS TREATY SIXTH REVIEW CONFERENCE

Sixth dispatch from Carol Urner at the United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland: 11/24/06

NOTE: Contact me with questions or comments at carol.disarm@gmail.com and I will try to respond.

This was the day we gave our WILPF seminar at lunch time, from 1:15 until 3:45 p.m. Susi Snyder, our International General Secretary moderated and Dr.Jane Ecklein of Boston Branch gave the major presentation. I finished up at the end with a brief overview of some of the organizations trying to bring more transparency and accountability into the vast new U.S. biodefense/bioweapons research program.

I think Joan did a great job of summarizing the paper. (You can download the paper here.) The Boston experience has been a powerful one as the affected community and a variety of NGOs have banded together to resist the placement of a BSL 4 Homeland Security Bioterror research lab in a densely populated Afro American neighborhood, or, indeed, anywhere in Boston or Massachusetts. This lab is planned for research on always fatal diseases for which there is no cure. Of course a vaccine for Ebola, a rather rare but virulent African disease, would be of benefit to humankind, but there is already strong evidence that the research will be about more than just vaccine production. It will be dual use research that will feed into military laboratories, and research that can be used for bioweapons development as well as biodefense. In WILPF we find the lack of transparency and oversight in this huge bioterror research program ($44 billion allocated since the U.S. torpedoed the inspection protocol in late 2001) very worrisome and not in our own nation's best interest. It is also troubling to other nations which begin to suspect U.S. motivations in mounting what Senator Frist has referred to as a "Manhattan Project" in this type of research.

In my part of the presentation, much shorter than Joan's since hers was the main focus of our seminar, I projected our DISARM UPDATE web site with links to the Sunshine Project, Tri-Valley Cares, the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, our own WILPF web sites and the web sites of the Boston organizations tracking the plans for the BSL 4 lab there. We also distributed a hard copy list of the web sites and copies of the Sunshine Project map and list of bioterror BSL 3 and BSL 4 labs in universities and military sites around the country.

I was careful to commend the delegates on the positive thrust of their deliberations and expressed our hope for their success. I also pointed out that the citizen action in Boston illustrates the efforts of citizen groups to get the very transparency and oversight of biomedical research that they are seeking in the Treaty Review Conference. This kind of citizen action is occurring across our own country as we seek to ensure that none of this research is to be used for bioweapons development. We hope that similar citizen movements are occurring in other countries since such efforts are needed to push governments toward the transparency and oversight needed if the treaty is to succeed.

All three of us made it clear that WILPF opposes biodefense, as well as biowarfare research outlawed by the treaty, since much of biodefense research is dual purpose and has been used in the past to mask bioweapons development. We also made clear that WILPF is still pressing for an inspection protocol in the future, but believes this Review Conference can help develop the transparency, trust and national legislation that will make such a protocol possible .

We were not able to provide an actual lunch so the attendance was less than we would have likeed. Other seminars were preceded by a popular sandwich lunch available to all delegates, but the cost was around $1200. WILPF doesn't have that kind of funding at present! However, about 15 delegates joined the few remaining NGO representatives -- really a lot to ask after they'd sat until 1:00 in grueling sessions, and would return for more of the same -- sans lunch -- when our presentation ended.

Tamara James, our U.S. Co-President, took pictures at the seminar, and DISARM interns Beatrice Fihn (Sweden) and Katherine Harrison (USA) are writing up a report. Susi emailed she is trying to post it with the photos but is having difficulty sizing the pictures because of unfamiliar soft ware.

From the
BIO-WEAPONS TREATY SIXTH REVIEW CONFERENCE

Fifth dispatch from Carol Urner at the United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland: 11/24/06

NOTE: Contact me with questions or comments at carol.disarm@gmail.com. Geneva UN has wireless and I will try to respond.

The formal discussions move along at a fast pace, subjecting the treaty to the first article by article review since 1991. I talked with the delegate from Argentina at lunch, herself a biologist, who indicated the tone is still upbeat and hopeful, with areas of agreement continuing to emerge. All decisions must be made by consensus, and the delegates have not yet moved to that stage.

The noon forum, presented by Amy Smithson, PhD of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, surveyed 52 U.S. policy makers regarding their current perceptions on the dangers of biological weapons to the US, and on policy and counter measures required . Those surveyed included four former Secretaries of Defense, a past CIA Director, national security experts and current top decision makers. Of these 52 75% believe bioweapons are a major threat, and 48% think they are a greater threat to the U.S. than nuclear weapons. 83% felt the threat of attack is on the increase, although 59% do not think it is very likely in the next 5 years. 81%, however, believe an attack is somewhat or very likely in the next ten years, and one respondent even said such an attack is certain. Most (71%) thought any such an attack would be made by a “lone wolf” or deranged individual.

I think this part of the study would have been much more helpful if she had broken down the groups of respondents. I would have expected a higher perception of threat among current decision makers than among those who had been in power 1992 to 2000, but would like to have seen this confirmed or denied. I also wonder how perceptions of experts compared with those of policy makers.

The second half of the study was more heartening than the first. 98% support vigorous biosecurity measures and. 94% support oversight of genetic engineering involving highly infectious pathogens. 94% also wanted criminalization of biological weapons related activities. Some of these responses were broken down by respondents, and did indicate that lower percentages of current policy makers support a standardized life sciences curriculum or codes of conduct than do either past policy makers of experts.The oddest result, however, was that 54% thought bioweapons should be a policy priority, but a whopping 77% made it a spending priority. And spend, spend, spend is what the government is doing with bioweapons now accounting for 44 billion in appropriations since 2001.

The writer did include a range of unattributed quotes in response to each section, and these added life to the pages of charts and percentages. Of course my favorites were ones like “Since this treaty does not have monitoring provisions, there ought to be a major U.S. initiative to inspire them. We should be at the negotiating table on this, leading the way!” Right on! But, unfortunately, that doesn’t sound like the response of a current policy maker.

The most heartening finding for me was that a full 69% believed monitoring provisions should be added to the bioweapons ban treaty, but there was no breakdown among classifications of respondents. So out with John Bolton and his friends in the Administration and let's go for it!

From the
BIO-WEAPONS TREATY SIXTH REVIEW CONFERENCE

Fourth dispatch from Carol Urner at the United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland: 11/23/06

NOTE: Contact me with questions or comments at carol.disarm@gmail.com. Geneva UN has wireless and I will try to respond.

Today the lunch time seminar was again the highlight. It was presented by Gigi Kwik Gronvall of the Center for Biosecurity. This is an NGO that supports Biodefense Research and publishes a quarterly journal, Biosecurity Journal, that examines from a medical perspective some of the problems and challenges arising in the program . The presenter gave good basic information on the civilian high containment laboratories (like the controversial Level-4 lab proposed for Boston) but glossed over the questionable aspects. She was young, personable and, I think, sincere, but her presentation reminded me of the upbeat promotion of Three Mile Island given to our Friends Meeting by their public relations specialist just a few days before the nuclear accident there shut down the plant.

She was willing to answer my questions, however, and we had a fairly long private talk after the session. Her paper and a map of all the known Level-4 bio labs in the world should soon be up on the web site, in addition to some pertinent articles already there. Our chat is summarized below, but first let me share two other bits of information.

Angela Woodward gave me the URL for the Verification Matters text which I reported on yesterday and found so useful. Explore it yourself -- I think it will prove an excellent tool for members of Congress on committees dealing with various aspects of biosecurity. It suggests ways to develop transparency within national programs and begin laying foundations for the verification process that is so badly needed.

I was pleased that Kathryn Nixdorff of the INES Working Group on Biological and Toxic Weapons Control sought me out to provide a better answer to my question two days ago about genetic specific weapons. She said it was not a question she expected, and she did not like "to go there" because the possibilities are too horrific to contemplate. However it is true that specific gene markers do exist in some ethnic populations that could be targeted. They usually appear in less that 10% (or as little as 1%) of the population but that could be enough to disrupt a society and sow terror in the populace. When I asked if the marker might also appear in people who did not even know their ancestors included someone from a targeted ethnic group -- most of us are mongrels, after all -- she answered in the affirmative. We agreed that this is the kind of research that should not be allowed to happen. I think now and again of that telltale sentence in the New American Century Rebuilding America's Defenses Report (page 60): And advanced forms of biological warfare that can "target" specific genotypes may transform biowarfare from the realm of terror to a politically useful tool.

Back to High Containment Labs: Gigi said that small pox research (for which both Russia and the US have sought permission from WHO to do, rather than destroy the remaining stocks of the virus) is necessary to develop a safer vaccine just in case some of the securely stored remaining virus has somehow gotten into the hands of terrorists. She displayed the recent letter from Douglas J. Beecher of the FBI in which for the first time it was said that the anthrax in the 2001 attacks was not military quality after all. She said she would send me a copy of the letter by email (I wonder if she really will), and could not explain why the FBI had waited so long to reveal this after four years of agreeing that some (not all) of the anthrax was almost certainly from a U.S. military lab. She also said that the new labs are not, contrary to my understanding, funded by Homeland Security through Project BioShield. Project BioShield is a program that enables the government to purchase and stockpile vaccines produced in the research program, but the funding for labs is from Health and Human Services through the National Institute of Health (NIH). Similarly, Bio Sense tracks unusual virus presence in the environment and Bio Watch monitors airport biosecurity. She pointed out the biodefense budget analysis by the Center for Bio security, but made no comment about the fact that regular public health and disease research programs are being cut as funds are shifted to bio defense. In other words, real health threats like cancer, AIDS, etc. are receiving less funding while the government prepares for potential threats that may never exist.

I regret that I didn't ask her about BARDA, the new legislation that now exempts bio-defense research from public scrutiny and inquiries under the Freedom of Information Act. Our government has been moving in the direction of much greater secrecy, rather than transparency, and that trend must be reversed if we are ever to rid the world of bioweapons.

From the
BIO-WEAPONS TREATY SIXTH REVIEW CONFERENCE
Third dispatch from Carol Urner at the United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland: 11/22/06